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D'Alemberte: The Per NOTES
Diem Approach to Damages for Pain and Suffering
THE PER DIEM APPROACH TO DAMAGES
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING
The advent of an organized plaintiff's bar and a militant defendant's organization has brought to a head many disputes regarding
trial practice that are often disagreeable to the bar in general. One
of the more vehement disagreements concerns what has been styled
the "per diem" approach to damages. This technique involves a prorating of such subjective factors as pain and suffering, embarrassment,
and inconvenience over finite periods. Thus a plaintiff's attorney might
include in his argument to the jury a suggestion that the award be
based on a fixed sum per hour or per day for the life expectancy of
his injured client. ("After all, what is fifty cents an hour for all this
pain and suffering?") The conflicting values are the right of counsel
to argue his case fully to the jury and the right of the defendant to
keep the plaintiff's argument limited strictly to the evidence. Because
the per diem approach has aided in securing more generous verdicts
for damages, it has been vigorously attacked by defendants' lawyers,
who contend that such arguments are improper because there can be
no evidence of the monetary value of pain and suffering.'
This trial technique, espoused by Melvin Belli, the prophet of
"adequate award,"2 has frequently been discussed by both plaintiffs'
and defense attorneys' periodicals, with strikingly divergent interpretations of the pertinent cases. 3
WEIGHING THE AUTHORITIES

Many jurisdictions have recently considered the propriety of the
per diem damages argument. In terms of that mythical measure, the
weight of authority, there is no conclusive answer to the problem.
Seven states4 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
I.

See Flaxmam, Pain, MrD. TRIAL TECH. Q. 51 (June 1957).
DAMAGES 15 (1959); The Adequate Award, 39

2. See 1 BELLT, MODERN
CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1951).

3. NACCA L.J. was first published in 1948. The Defense Research Institute publishes For the Defense, which contains such remarks as the following
comment on a Wisconsin case dealing with the present topic: "Wisconsin becomes the sixth state since mid-1958 completely to bar the door against such
presentations. This means that 50 million Americans are free of the threat of
this forensic gimmick." Jan. 1961, p. 6.
4. Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Faught v. Washam, 329
S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713, 60 A.L.R.2d
1331 (1958); Quinn v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 162, 73 Ad. 319
(1909); Certified T. V. and Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109
S.E.2d 126 (1959); Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis. 2d
604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960). Minnesota is counted in this tally, but there is
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Circuit3 have refused to permit the practice, while nine states and the
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits7 have allowed
it in one form or another. Florida's Third District Court of Appeal
seems to agree with the latter group.8
To list a compilation of jurisdictions is to oversimplify the problem, for in the final analysis there are three general views that may
be taken of the practice: (1) It should not be allowed as a matter
of law; (2) it is counsel's right to suggest a per diem award; (3) the
matter should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.
The decision probably will not be made on the basis of the
plaintiff's rights if the trial judge allows the practice, since it is
easier to persuade an appellate court that the trial judge has discretion in the matter than to argue that the counsel has a right to
so argue in all cases.
The positions of the above noted states could be analyzed in
detail, but the examination would be of dubious value because of
gratuitous remarks by the courts and local procedural technicalities.,
However, several leading cases should be considered. In Botta v.
Brunner o the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the practice was
not to be allowed because of the impact of speculative suggestions
on the jury and the inherent unfairness to the defense. Recognizing
the tactical advantages of the practice," the court concluded that
the argument "ineffect becomes testimony.''"12
Mississippi's different view emphasizes the common sense and
some doubt as to its position. Compare Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus. Co.,
248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956), with Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R.,
251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958).
5. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 Fed. 881 (8th Cir. 1922).
6. Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138 (1956); Caley v. Manicke,
173 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. 2d 1961); Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130
N.E.2d 491 (1955); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960);
Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev.
437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Louisiana 9- Ark. Ry. v. Mullins, 326 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d
575 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 55 Wash. 2d 902, 351 P.2d 153 (1960).
7. Bowers v. The Pennsylvania R.R., 281 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1960); Imperial Oil,
Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
8. Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
9. See, e.g., Quinn v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 162, 73 At.
319 (1909), holding that it is error to suggest even a total amount for pain and
suffering.
10. 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). See unfavorable comments in 12 RUTGERS
L. REv. 522 (1958); 4 VILL. L. REV. 137 (1958).
11. Citations by the court are to an "outspoken exponent" of the practice,
Belli. See Belli, "The Use of Demonstrative Evidence in Achieving the More
Adequate Award," address to the Mississippi Bar, reprinted in 22 Miss. L.J. 28.1,
306 (1951).
12.

26 NJ. at 100, 138 A.2d at 723.
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judgment of the jury, and the conclusion in that jurisdiction is that
3
such arguments are the "perfect right" of counsel.'
This, then, seems to be the source of the dichotomy: When there
is confidence in the judgment of jurors, there is no objection to
per diem arguments; but when the weight of the psychological impact on the jurors' minds is deemed controlling, these arguments
are not permitted.
FLORIDA'S UNCERTAIN POSITION

Three Florida decisions have touched on the per diem argument.
In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Braddock,14 a 1957 case, the Supreme
Court's decision was a per curiam "affirmed." But a dissenting
opinion- indicates that criticism of the per diem approach to damages for future pain and suffering and physical disability and inability to lead a normal life was before the Court. The usage of
per curiam "affirmed" has been held to mean that the points raised
on appeal are carefully considered and that no merit is found in
the appeal."" The dissenting judge's mention of the per diem technique indicates that perhaps this point was before the Court and
was passed upon.'7 The fact that a number of courts have overlooked

13. Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957).
14. 96 So. 2d 127, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957).
15. 96 So. 2d at 128.
16. South Florida Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960).
17. The full course of the Braddock case should be traced, for it is of some
importance to this discussion. The first appeal, 80 So. 2d 662, was taken in 1955
by the plaintiff from an order granting a new trial following his refusal to accept a remittitur reducing to present worth the amount awarded. The remittitur was ordered by the trial judge when the jury returned the exact amount
suggested by plaintiff's counsel, including damages for pain and suffering. The
Supreme Court discussed the fact that the large verdict had been obtained by
use of the per diem argument but pointed out that this argument had not been
challenged. Id. at 668. The Court held that the trial judge was in error in
ordering a remittitur. In the second appeal, by the defendant from final judgment,
the dissent of Ogilvie, Assoc. J., states that points were taken into consideration
that could not be considered in the earlier appeal. 96 So. 2d at 128. This is
the basis for arguing that the per diem approach was before the Court on the
second appeal, but conversations with the attorneys involved have convinced the
writer that it was not an issue in either appeal. This makes the citations to
Braddock on this point more interesting. See, e.g., 12 RuTGERs L. REv. 522 (1958).
See also the disparaging words of the Missouri Supreme Court in Faught v.
Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 604 (1959): "[W]e find no more incisive and devastating
critique of the mathematical formula argument than the action of a Dade County,
Florida, jury in returning a verdict for $248,439, the precise amount sought by
counsel in a mathematical formula argument, and the action of the Supreme Court
of Florida in affirming that judgment without opinion."
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it is another argument for those who believe that the key number
system buries as much law as it preserves. 8
Braddock was a problem to the Third District Court of Appeal
when it considered the question of per diem argument in Ratner v.
Arrington. 9 That court stated that the question had not been decided in this state but declared that the Braddock case "implicitly
endorsed the use of the per diem argument by affirming a jury
verdict .. .which coincided exactly with the aggregate of the plaintiff's demands
...
2.
20
The court examined the authorities 2 ' and

held that in this particular case the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by allowing the use of a placard containing suggested
per diem damages.2 2 The decision was specifically limited to the
case at hand, and the court, in a footnote, indicated that certain
23
features of the per diem approach were open to adverse argument.
The final Florida case directly on point was decided by the Circuit Court of Duval County in 1959. In Bennett v. Rapid Moving
& Storage Co.24 Judge Maness held that it was proper for the attorney to make per diem damages suggestions to the jury. This opinion
stands as an eloquent endorsement of the jury system. Judge Maness
declared:25

"Jurors aren't so easily fooled - they know the nature of pain
and the nature of money and can detect unreasonable and
phoney claims asserted by counsel in a dosing argument in
whatever form they take as easily and as correctly as they can
reconcile the conflicting testimony of the parties and other
witnesses on a multitude of other issues. This is the juror's
province."
However well reasoned, the trial court's decision in the Bennett
18. The headstone on this grave bears the epitaph "Railroads 353."
19. 111 So. 2d 82 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). The reason Braddock was not lost
for this court was that the same law firms represented plaintiffs and defendants
in both cases.
20. 111 So. 2d at 88.
21. Ibid.
22. "Recent holdings, for and against the allowance of such arguments, are
not grounded on reasons of sufficient force to compel the decision either way.
The ultimate course of judicial opinion on the point is not yet discernible. Therefore, in approving the practice now we do not purport to foreclose the question."
111 So. 2d at 89.
23. 111 So. 2d at 87, n.3; the Court pointed to the overlapping features of
the various types of subjective damages, leaving an appreciable gap in this aspect
of the problem.
24. 14 Fla. Supp. 37 (Cir. Ct.), decided in Jan. 1959, before the Ratner case
and after the second Braddock appeal. Braddock was not mentioned by Judge
Maness.
25. 14 Fla. Supp. at 41.
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case will not be binding on the Florida Supreme Court. Nor is the
Ratner decision strong persuasive authority, since Chief Judge Carroll limited its scope. The language of the first Braddock case is
no guide, for its somewhat ambiguous dictum concerning the per
diem approach has permitted its use by other courts to buttress opposing positions.26 Chief Judge Carroll was right when he said
that "the ultimate course of judicial opinion on this point is not
27
yet discernible."
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS FOR FLORIDA LAW

In Florida there is no certainty as to the future of the per diem
approach. The Braddock case should not hinder a court that wishes
to restrict argument, but other decisions indicate a trend toward
a wider scope of permissible argument. For example, the Florida
Supreme Court found no prejudicial error in counsel's statement
that some corporations do not hesitate to take the life blood of ordinary people, and stated that argument is not confined to the evidence
but may be illustrated with matters of every-day knowledge and
28
experience.
When concerned with the admissibility of subjective demonstrative evidence, the Court has shown considerable confidence in
the discretionary judgment of the trial judge, and perhaps also
in the ability of jurors to analyze subjective injuries. 29 The final
decision on per diem assessment for subjective damages may well be
based on a valuation of the jury system, and will probably favor
plaintiffs.
TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE

26. "Jurors know the nature of pain, embarrassment and inconvenience, and
they also know the nature of money. Their problem of equating the two to
afford reasonable and just compensation calls for a high order of human judgment, and the law has provided no better yardstick for their guidance than their
enlightened conscience. Their problem is not one of mathematical calculation
but involves an exercise of their sound judgment of what is fair and right. The
problem is often further complicated by the fact that the pain and suffering are
yet to be suffered and thus even further removed from exact calculation and
certain measurement. But such further uncertainty does not change the problem from one of judgment to one of calculation." 80 So. 2d at 668. Compare
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 103, 138 A.2d 713, 725 (1958), which approved these
words as "an excellent expression of the fundamental doctrine to which we
adhere," with Bennett v. Rapid Moving & Storage Co., 14 Fla. Supp. 37, 40 (1959).
27. lll So. 2d at 89.
28. St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 670 (Fla.

1950).
29.

Florida Motor Lines v. Bradley, 121 Fla. 591, 164 So. 360 (1935).
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